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Fair Use in The Netherlands – a Renaissance?
Flexibility and legal certainty
International lawmaking and harmonisation activities 
have led to a remarkable approximation of Anglo-American 
copyright and continental-European droit d’auteur. To this 
day, however, the approach to copyright limitations differs 
significantly: Whereas continental-European countries 
provide for a closed catalogue of carefully-defined limita-
tions, the Anglo-American copyright tradition allows for 
an open-ended fair-use system that leaves the task of iden-
tifying individual cases of exempted unauthorised use to 
the courts. A prominent example of the latter approach is 
the fair-use doctrine that has evolved in the United States. 
Section 107 of the US Copyright Act permits the unauthor-
ised use of copyrighted material for purposes ‘such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching […], scholarship, 
or research.’2 To guide the decision on individual forms of 
use, four factors are set forth in the provision which shall 
be taken into account among other considerations that 
may be relevant in a given case:
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes;
Tijdens de implementatie van de Auteursrechtrichtlijn heeft de Nederlandse wetge-
ver de voorkeur gegeven aan het handhaven van een gesloten systeem van nauw-
keurig in de wet omschreven beperkingen van het auteursrecht.1 In vergelijking met 
open, op abstracte factoren rustende systemen, zoals de fair-use doctrine in de VS, 
vermindert deze beslissing aan de ene kant de flexibiliteit op het terrein van beper-
kingen. Aan de andere kant lijkt het weliswaar aannemelijk dat zo’n gesloten systeem 
meer rechtszekerheid biedt en daardoor het nadeel van trage wettelijke reacties op 
snelle technologische veranderingen compenseert. Met een beroep op de Europese driestappentoets waarmee 
Nederlandse rechters de gedetailleerde nationale regelingen inzake beperkingen wegwuiven, is het beweerde 
voordeel van vergrote rechtszekerheid echter niet langer realiseerbaar. De Nederlandse infrastructuur op het 
gebied van auteursrechtelijke beperkingen verkeert derhalve in een deplorabele staat. Het systeem biedt noch 
voldoende flexibiliteit noch genoeg rechtszekerheid. De tijd is dus rijp om de optie van een fair-use bepaling die 
ten minste voor meer flexibiliteit zou zorgen in heroverweging te nemen. 
In the course of implementing the EC Copyright Directive, the Dutch legislator decided to maintain a closed 
system of carefully-defined copyright limitations.1 This decision, on the one hand, reduces flexibility in the field 
of limitations when compared with open systems resting on a set of abstract factors, such as the US fair-use 
doctrine. On the other hand, it may be expected to outweigh the disadvantage of slow legislative reactions to 
rapid technological change by enhancing legal certainty. With Dutch courts invoking the EC three-step test to 
supersede the detailed domestic rules governing limitations, however, the alleged advantage of enhanced legal 
certainty can no longer be realised. In consequence, the Dutch limitation infrastructure is in a lamentable state. 
It provides neither sufficient flexibility nor sufficient legal certainty. Hence, the time is ripe to reconsider the 
option of introducing a fair-use clause that would offer at least more flexibility.
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1  See chapter I, § 6 of the Dutch Copyright Act (Auteurswet).
2  See Sec. 107 of the US Copyright Act. The list is understood as an open, non-
exclusive enumeration. See Senate and House Committee Reports, as quoted 
by L.E. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright – The Exclusive Rights Tensions 
in the 1976 Copyright Act, Cambridge (Massachusetts)/London: Harvard Universi-
ty Press 1978, p. 19-20: ‘[…] since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no 
generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question 
must be decided on its own facts… The bill endorses the purpose and general 
scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use […] but there is no disposition to free-
ze the doctrine in the statute […]. Beyond a very broad statutory explanation 
of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be 
free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.’
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(2)  the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.3
On the basis of this legislative framework and established 
case law, US courts conduct a case-by-case analysis in order 
to determine whether a given use can be exempted from 
the control of the copyright holder.4 The foremost advan-
tage of this open-ended system can be seen in sufficient 
flexibility for safeguarding copyright’s delicate balance 
between exclusive rights and limitations satisfying social, 
cultural and economic needs. Within the flexible fair-use 
framework, the courts can broaden and restrict the scope 
of limitations. In this way, they are capable of adapting the 
copyright limitation infrastructure to new circumstances 
and challenges, such as the digital environment. Leaving 
this discretion to the courts reduces the need for constant 
amendments to legislation that may have difficulty in keep-
ing pace with the speed of technological development.5
The advantage of flexibility, so runs the counter-argu-
ment of opponents of fair use, implies the risk of legal 
uncertainty.6 The validity of this argument appears doubt-
ful in the light of established case law that testifies to a 
long US tradition of identifying fair-use limitations case-by-
case. The assertion of insufficient legal certainty, however, 
offers advocates of restrictively-delineated limitations the 
opportunity to present traditional continental-European 
systems as shining examples of legal certainty. In this line 
of reasoning, the detailed definition of limitations in con-
tinental-European copyright legislation clearly indicates 
the scope of permitted unauthorised use, and makes court 
decisions foreseeable – even in the digital environment. 
Worst-case scenario
Current EC legislation on copyright limitations can be 
characterised as a halfway house combining elements of 
both traditions.7 On the one hand, Art. 5 of the Copyright 
Directive 2001/29 recalls the continental-European tradi-
tion by providing for a closed catalogue of limitations. On 
the other hand, the enumerated limitations are subject to 
the three-step test that has become part of the acquis com-
munautaire. A line between the system of abstract criteria 
established by the test – certain special cases, no conflict 
with a normal exploitation, no unreasonable prejudice to 
legitimate interests – and open-ended provisions, such as 
the US fair-use doctrine, can easily be drawn.8 The drafting 
history of the three-step test, moreover, confirms that the 
flexible formula has its roots in the Anglo-American copy-
right tradition.9
The corrosive effect of this hybrid EC concept on tradi-
tional continental-European systems with carefully-defined 
limitations can currently be observed in the Netherlands. 
Dutch courts applied the three-step test already prior to 
the Copyright Directive.10 On the one hand, the adoption 
and implementation of the Directive led to more frequent 
references to the three-step test that are made to confirm 
and strengthen findings equally following from domestic 
rules.11 This way of applying the three-step test has little 
impact on the Dutch catalogue of limitations. On the other 
hand, however, the Directive inspired a line of decisions 
that use the three-step test to override the closed Dutch sys-
tem of statutory limitations. 
In a ruling of March 2, 2005, the District Court of The 
Hague forced the long-standing exception for press reviews 
onto the sidelines, and invoked the three-step test of the 
3  See Sec. 107 of the US Copyright Act. 
4  The factors provide guidance for the application of the ‘equitable rule of rea-
son’ which fair use represents. Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), section IV.B. Additional factors may be taken into 
account. As to the application of the fair-use doctrine in practice, see P.N. 
Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, Harvard Law Review 103 (1990), p. 1105 (1125-
1130); J. Litman, ‘Reforming Information Law in Copyright’s Image’, University 
of Dayton Law Review 22 (1997), p. 588 (612); D. Nimmer, ‘“Fairest of Them All” 
and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use’, in: J. Boyle (ed.), ‘Law and Contemporary 
Problems’, Duke University Law Journal 66 (2003), p. 263.
5  See M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Beperkingen à la carte: Waarom de Auteursrechtricht-
lijn ruimte laat voor fair use’, AMI 2003, p. 10; Chr.A. Alberdingk Thijm, ‘Fair 
use: het auteursrechtelijk evenwicht hersteld’, AMI 1998, p. 145, en ‘Fair use 
– In weiter Ferne, so nah’, AMI 1998, p. 176.
6  See H. Cohen Jehoram, ‘Fair use – die ferne Geliebte’, AMI 1998, p. 174, ‘Imple-
mentatie van de Auteursrechtrichtlijn – De stille strijd tegen een spookrijder’, 
NJB 2002, p. 1690, ‘Nu de gevolgen van trouw en ontrouw aan de Auteursrech-
trichtlijn voor fair use, tijdelijke reproductie en driestappentoets’, AMI 2005, 
p. 153, ‘Wie is bang voor de driestappentoets in de Auteursrechtrichtlijn?’, in: 
N.A.N.M. van Eijk & P.B. Hugenholtz (eds.), Dommering-bundel, Amsterdam: Otto 
Cramwinckel Uitgever 2008, p. 57.
7  See M.R.F. Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test – an Analysis of 
the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law, The Hague/London/New 
York: Kluwer Law International 2004, p. 278-281.
8  In particular, the prohibition of a conflict with a normal exploitation in the 
three-step test recalls fourth fair-use factor ‘effect of the use upon the poten-
tial market for or value of the copyrighted work’. Cf. K.J. Koelman, ‘Fixing the 
Three-Step Test’, EIPR 2006, p. 407.
9  See observation by the United Kingdom, Doc. S/13, Records of the Intellectual Pro-
perty Conference of Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 1967, Geneva: WIPO 1971, p. 630. Cf. 
Senftleben, supra note 7, p. 47-52.
10  In the case Zienderogen Kunst, dating back to the year 1990, the Dutch Supreme 
Court invoked the three-step test of Art. 9(2) of the Berne Convention to sup-
port its holding that the quotation of a work may not substantially prejudice 
the right holder’s interest in the exploitation of the work concerned. See 
Hoge Raad, June 22, 1990, no. 13933, NJ 1991, p. 268 with case comment by J.H. 
Spoor; Informatierecht/AMI 1990, p. 202 with case comment by E.J. Dommering; 
AA 40 (1991), p. 672 with case comment by H. Cohen Jehoram. 
11  In 2003, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals found that a parody did not harm 
the normal exploitation of the parodied work because it concerned a diffe-
rent market. See Gerechtshof Amsterdam, January 30, 2003, AMI 2003, p. 94 
with case comment by K.J. Koelman. In a 2006 decision concerning online 
advertisements reproducing the so-called ‘TRIPP TRAPP chair’, the Court of 
Zwolle-Lelystad referred to the three-step test of Art. 5(5) of the Directive in the 
context of Art. 23 of the Dutch Copyright Act – a limitation permitting the use 
of certain artistic works for the purpose of advertising their public exhibition 
or sale. The Court found that the use in question prejudiced the exploitation 
interest of the right holder. This was one of the reasons for denying compli-
ance with Art. 23. See Rechtbank Zwolle-Lelystad, May 3, 2006, case no. 106031, 
LJN AW6288, AMI 2006, p. 179 with case comment by K.J. Koelman; Mediaforum 
2006/9 with case comment by B.T. Beuving.
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Copyright Directive instead.12 The case concerned the 
unauthorised scanning and reproduction of press articles 
for internal electronic communication (via e-mail, intra-
net etc.) in ministries – a practice that also offered certain 
search and archive functions. Seeking to determine whether 
this practice was permissible, the Court refused to consider 
several questions raised by the parties with regard to the 
specific rules laid down in Art. 15 of the Dutch Copyright 
Act and Art. 5(3)(c) of the Copyright Directive. In the Court’s 
view, consideration of these specific rules was unnecessary 
because the contested use did not meet the requirements 
of the EC three-step test anyway:
The reason for leaving these three questions unanswered is that 
the digital press review practice of the State, in the opinion of 
the court, does not comply with the so-called three-step test of 
Art. 5(5) of the Copyright Directive.13 
The subsequent discussion of non-compliance with the 
three-step test resembles a US fair-use analysis rather than 
a close inspection of a continental-European statutory limi-
tation. In particular, the Court stresses the growing impor-
tance of digital newspaper exploitation and the impact of 
digital press reviews on this promising market. The minis-
try press reviews are held to ‘endanger’ a normal exploita-
tion of press articles and unreasonably prejudice the pub-
lisher’s legitimate interest in digital commercialisation.14 
Under the fourth US fair-use factor ‘effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work’, 
similar considerations could play a decisive role.15 
The focus on the three-step test, constituting the basis of 
the Court’s reasoning in the press review case, inevitably 
marginalizes the detailed rules established in Dutch law. 
On its merits, the applicable statutory limitation laid down 
in Art. 15 of the Dutch Copyright Act, merely opens the door 
to the three-step test. As a result, it is rendered incapable of 
influencing the further test procedure.16 
In a more recent decision of June 25, 2008, the District 
Court of The Hague, again, invoked the three-step test. In 
a case concerning the payment of equitable remuneration 
for private copying activities, the Court devoted attention 
to the question of use of an illegal source as a basis for pri-
vate copying.17 The detailed regulation of private copying 
in Art. 16c of the Dutch Copyright Act does not contain any 
indication to the effect that private copying from an illegal 
source is to be deemed impermissible. The drafting history 
of the provision, by contrast, reflects the clear intention 
of the Dutch legislator to exempt private copying irrespec-
tive of whether a legal or illegal source is used.18 Having 
recourse to the three-step test of Art. 5(5) of the Copyright 
Directive, the District Court of The Hague, nonetheless, dis-
mantles this seemingly robust edifice of legal certainty in 
one single sentence. Without offering a detailed analysis, 
the Court stated that private copying from an illegal source 
was ‘in conflict with the three-step test’. Accordingly, it was 
held to fall outside the private copying exemption of Art. 
16c:
In the parliamentary history, there are indications of a dif-
ferent interpretation. However, the interpretation advocated 
by the minister and supported by the government – assuming 
that private copying from an illegal source was legal – is in 
conflict with the three-step test of Art. 5(5) of the Directive.19
The central point here is not the prohibition of private 
copying using illegal sources. It is the erosion of the major 
argument advanced in favour of carefully-defined continen-
tal-European limitations and against the Anglo-American 
fair-use system. Regardless of detailed definitions given in 
the Dutch Copyright Act, the ruling of the Court minimises 
the degree of legal certainty in the field of copyright limi-
tations. Users of copyrighted material in the Netherlands 
can no longer rely on the wording of relevant statutory 
limitations. On the basis of the EC three-step test, a certain 
use may be held to amount to copyright infringement even 
though it is exempted from the authorisation of the right 
holder in the Dutch Copyright Act.20 
The Court’s way of applying the three-step test enhances 
legal uncertainty. In general, a court invoking the EC three-
step test ought to be alert to the risk of legal uncertainty 
which this departure from the wording of national provi-
sions implies. Hence, national courts can be expected to 
offer a detailed explanation of the requirements resulting 
from the test’s abstract criteria to make future decisions 
and further adaptations of national limitations foresee-
12  See Rechtbank Den Haag, March 2, 2005, case no. 192880, LJN AS 8778, Compu-
terrecht 2005, p. 143 with case comment by K.J. Koelman.
13  See Rechtbank Den Haag, ibid., para. 14: ‘De reden voor het thans onbeant-
woord laten van deze drie vragen is dat de digitale knipselkrantenpraktijk van 
de Staat naar het oordeel van de rechtbank de zogenoemde drie-stappen-toets 
van art. 5 lid 5 Auteursrechtrichtlijn niet kan doorstaan.’
14  See Rechtbank Den Haag, ibid., para. 16-18.
15  See the decision of the US Supreme Court in Sony Corporation of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417 (1984), section IV.B: ‘actual harm need 
not be shown […]. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm 
will result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.’
16  See M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘L’application du triple test: vers un système de fair use 
européen?’, Propriétés intellectuelles 2007, p. 453. 
17  See Rechtbank Den Haag, June 25, 2008, case no. 246698, LJN BD5690, AMI 
2008, p. 146 with case comment by C.B. van der Net. 
18  See the material quoted by the Rechtbank Den Haag, ibid., para. 4.4.1.
19  See Rechtbank Den Haag, June 25, 2008, case no. 246698, LJN BD5690, para. 
4.4.3: ‘In de parlementaire geschiedenis zijn weliswaar aanknopingspunten 
te vinden voor een andere uitleg, maar de door de minister voorgestane en 
door de regering onderschreven uitleg, waarbij ervan wordt uitgegaan dat een 
privé-kopie van een illegale bron legaal is, is in strijd met de drie-stappen-toets 
van artikel 5 lid 5 van de Richtlijn.’ The decision has been published in AMI 
2008, p. 146 with case comment by C.B. van der Net.
20  Cf. M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Privé-kopiëren in het licht van de driestappentoets – 
opmerkingen naar aanleiding van het vonnis van de Haagse rechtbank inzake 
de thuiskopie’, IER 2008, p. 265.
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able.21 The simple formula of ‘conflict with the three-step 
test’ used by the District Court of The Hague hardly meets 
this basic requirement of applying flexible, open norms.
In sum, the current situation in the Netherlands can 
be qualified as a worst-case scenario. On the one hand, 
copyright limitations are straitjacketed. Invoking the EC 
three-step test, Dutch courts seem likely to further restrict 
statutory limitations that are embedded in a detailed leg-
islative framework anyway. On the basis of this approach, 
it is impossible to realise the central advantage of flexibil-
ity that is inherent in open norms with abstract criteria, 
such as the three-step test. On the other hand, the purport-
ed advantage of legal certainty that justifies the system 
of carefully-defined limitations, is also beyond reach. As 
the EC three-step test is invoked by the courts to override 
detailed national provisions, users of copyrighted material 
cannot rely on the wording of Dutch limitations. The valid-
ity of detailed rules set forth in the Dutch Copyright Act 
is hanging by the thread of compliance with the abstract 
criteria of the EC three-step test. In a nutshell, the current 
Dutch system of copyright limitations provides neither suf-
ficient flexibility for copyright limitations nor sufficient 
legal certainty for users of copyrighted material. It com-
bines the two disadvantages of the Anglo-American and the 
continental-European approach.
Remaining option
With the Copyright Directive subjecting the applica-
tion of copyright limitations to the three-step test, it is no 
longer feasible to attain the degree of legal certainty that 
may be reached in a traditional continental-European sys-
tem with a closed catalogue of carefully-defined limita-
tions and no additional, abstract control mechanism. The 
EC three-step test can be repeated at the national level to 
clarify that unauthorised use of copyrighted material must 
not only comply with the specific requirements of national 
copyright limitations but also with the general criteria of 
the test.22 This clarification would reflect the approach cur-
rently taken by Dutch courts. However, it enhances rather 
than reduces the influence of the test’s open-ended criteria 
on detailed Dutch provisions, and paves the way for further 
inroads into the traditional system of carefully-defined 
limitations. More legal certainty than that provided by 
Anglo-American fair-use systems can hardly be achieved in 
this hybrid framework. The open criteria of the three-step 
test are just as unpredictable as US-American fair-use fac-
tors. With regard to the dilemma of combined inflexibility 
and legal uncertainty, it is therefore to be concluded that 
the problem of legal uncertainty cannot be solved in the 
current situation – irrespective of whether the EC three-
step test is included in national law.
What remains is the option to realise the advantage of 
Anglo-American fair-use conceptions: more flexibility in 
the field of copyright limitations. Admittedly, the current 
EC framework does not offer all features of classical fair-
use systems. Sec. 107 of the US Copyright Act refers to use 
for purposes ‘such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching […], scholarship, or research.’ The words ‘such as’ 
indicate that the expressly mentioned purposes merely 
serve as examples. Accordingly, US courts enjoy the free-
dom of identifying additional purposes and new forms of 
fair use.23 The closed list of permissible limitations in Art. 
5 of the Copyright Directive prevents national legislators in 
the EC from granting courts the same freedom. A flexible 
domestic concept of copyright limitations must necessarily 
keep within the limits of Art. 5. The EC catalogue of limi-
tations, on the other hand, has gradually been broadened 
during the process of drafting and adopting the Copyright 
Directive.24 The final version set out in the Directive com-
prises more than 20 permissible limitations. Against this 
background, an undue restriction of national fair-use sys-
tems need not be feared.
More importantly, the cases listed in Art. 5 reflect cer-
tain types of copyright limitations rather than delineating 
their conceptual contours precisely. Further concretisation 
is confidently left to national lawmakers. In this vein, the 
European Commission explicitly notes in its Green Paper 
‘Copyright in the Knowledge Economy’ that
[t]he conditions of application of the exceptions are drafted in 
rather general language. Arguably, the approach chosen by the 
21  See the requirement of foreseeability of the consequences of a given action, 
set forth by the European Court of Human Rights in the Sunday Times case, 
ECHR Judgement of April 26, 1979, Series A No. 30, para. 49. Cf. M.C. Janssens, 
‘Transparantie in het auteursrecht: een brug te ver?’, AMI 2004, p. 205.
22  This solution has been chosen, for instance, in France. See Art. L. 122-5 of the 
French Intellectual Property Act (Code de la propriété intellectuelle). Cf. A. 
Lucas/P. Sirinelli, ‘Chronique: Droit d’auteur et droits voisins’, Propriétés intellec-
tuelles 2006, p. 297 (314-316); V.L. Benabou, ‘Patatras! A propos de la décision du 
Conseil constitutionnel du 27 juillet 2006, Propriétés intellectuelles 2006, p. 240; 
C. Geiger, ‘The French Implementation of the Information Society Directive: 
a Disappointing Result of a Promising Debate’, AMI 2008, p. 1. In the Nether-
lands, H. Cohen Jehoram advocates the inclusion of the three-step test in the 
Copyright Act. See ‘Nu de gevolgen van trouw en ontrouw aan de Auteursrecht-
richtlijn voor fair use, tijdelijke reproductie en driestappentoets’, AMI 2005, p. 
153, ‘Wie is bang voor de driestappentoets in de Auteursrechtrichtlijn?’, in: 
N.A.N.M. van Eijk/P.B. Hugenholtz (eds.), Dommering-bundel, Amsterdam: Otto 
Cramwinckel 2008, p. 57. 
23  Cf. M.B. Nimmer/D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, LexisNexis: Matthew Bender 
& Company 2008, § 13.05[A][1][a], 13-155.
24  See M. Hart, ‘The Proposed Directive for Copyright in the Information Society: 
Nice Rights, Shame about the Exceptions’, EIPR 1998, p. 169; P.B. Hugenholtz, 
‘Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid’, EIPR 2000, 
p. 499; D.J.G. Visser, ‘De beperkingen in de Auteursrechtrichtlijn’, AMI 2001, 
p. 9; F. Bayreuther, ‘Beschränkungen des Urheberrechts nach der neuen EU-
Urheberrechtsrichtlinie’, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 2001, p. 828; J. 
Reinbothe, ‘Die EG-Richtlinie zum Urheberrecht in der Informationsgesell-
schaft’, GRUR Int. 2001, p. 733.
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drafters has left Member States a great deal of f lexibility in 
implementing the exceptions contained in the Directive. Apart 
from the exception on transient copying, national legislation 
can be more restrictive than the Directive as to the scope of 
exceptions.25
The Dutch legislator, however, may refrain from any 
further restrictions and implement literal copies of the 
prototypes listed in Art. 5 instead. To establish an open-
ended, flexible framework, these literal copies only need 
to be combined with the abstract criteria of the three-step 
test.26 In the aforementioned court decisions, the District 
Court of the Hague, for instance, could have arrived at the 
same conclusions on the basis of a general rule permitting 
unauthorised non-commercial private copying and the 
reproduction and communication to the public of current 
press articles on the condition that use falling within these 
categories does not cause a conflict with a work’s normal 
exploitation, and does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the right holder.
Enhanced flexibility
Lawmaking of this kind is capable of enhancing flexibil-
ity in the field of copyright limitations because it takes full 
advantage of the different functions of the three-step test. 
Instead of confining the test to an additional control mech-
anism and a straitjacket of copyright limitations, the test 
itself becomes part of a clause that offers breathing space 
for unauthorised use.27 Within the flexible framework of 
its abstract criteria, the courts are free to identify privi-
leged forms of use case-by-case. This ‘enabling’ function of 
the three-step test28 can hardly be perceived as a novelty. By 
contrast, it constitutes a central element of the adaptation 
of copyright law to the digital environment that is clearly 
reflected in the Agreed Statement concerning the three-
step tests of Art. 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty:
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Con-
tracting Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend 
into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in 
their national laws which have been considered acceptable 
under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these provisions should 
be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise new 
exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital 
network environment.
At the national level, the three-step test has been used in 
this enabling sense, for instance, in decisions of the Ger-
man Federal Court of Justice. In a 1999 case concerning the 
Technical Information Library Hannover, the Court under-
lined the public interest in unhindered access to infor-
mation. Accordingly, it offered support for the Library’s 
practice of copying and dispatching scientific articles on 
request by single persons and industrial undertakings.29 
The legal basis of this practice was the statutory limita-
tion for personal use in § 53 of the German Copyright Act. 
Under this provision, the authorised user need not neces-
sarily produce the copy herself but is free to ask a third 
party to make the reproduction on her behalf. The Court 
admitted that the dispatch of copies came close to a pub-
lisher’s activity.30 Nonetheless, it refrained from putting an 
end to the library practice by assuming a conflict with a 
work’s normal exploitation. Instead, the Court deduced an 
obligation to pay equitable remuneration from the three-
step test, and enabled the continuation of the information 
service in this way.31 
In a 2002 decision concerning the scanning and storing 
of press articles for internal e-mail communication in a 
private company, the Court gave a further example of its 
flexible approach to the three-step test. It held that digital 
press reviews had to be deemed permissible under § 49(1) 
of the German Copyright Act just like their analogue coun-
terparts, if the digital version – in terms of its functioning 
and potential for use – essentially corresponded to tradi-
tional analogue products.32 To overcome the problem of 
an outdated wording of § 49(1) that seemed to indicate the 
limitation’s confinement to press reviews on paper,33 the 
Court stated that, in view of new technical developments, 
a copyright limitation may be interpreted extensively.34 
Taking these considerations as a starting point, the Court 
arrived at the conclusion that digital press reviews were 
25  See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper Copyright in the 
Knowledge Economy, document COM(2008) 466/3, chapter 2, p. 5.
26  For a more detailed explanation of this proposal, see M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Beper-
kingen à la carte: Waarom de Auteursrechtrichtlijn ruimte laat voor fair use’, 
AMI 2003, p. 10.
27  See M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘L’application du triple test: vers un système de fair use 
européen?’, Propriétés intellectuelles 2007, p. 453.
28  See M.R.F. Senftleben, ‘Commentary on the WIPO Copyright Treaty’, in: Th. 
Dreier/P.B. Hugenholtz (eds.), Concise European Copyright Law, New York: Kluwer 
Law International 2006, p. 108. 
29  See Bundesgerichtshof, February 25, 1999, case no. I ZR 118/96, Juristenzeitung 
1999, p. 1000, with case comment by H. Schack. For an English description of 
the case, see Senftleben, supra note 7, p. 206-208.
30  See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 1004: ‘Durch die Übersendung selbst herge-
stellter Vervielfältigungsstücke übt der Kopienversanddienst eine Funktion 
aus, die nicht nur die Tendenz in sicht trägt, sich der Tätigkeit eines Verlegers 
anzunähern, sondern die auch mit der Werkvermittlung durch Abrufdaten-
banken verglichen werden kann.’
31  See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 1005-1007.  Cf. P. Baronikians, ‘Kopienversand 
durch Bibliotheken – rechtliche Beurteilung und Vorschläge zur Regelung’, 
Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 1999, p. 126. In the course of subsequent 
amendments to the Copyright Act, the German legislator modelled a new 
copyright limitation on the Court’s decision. § 53a of the German Copyright 
Act even goes beyond the court decision by including the dispatch of digital 
copies in graphical format.
32  See Bundesgerichtshof, July 11, 2002, case no. I ZR 255/00, GRUR 2002, p. 963; 
Juristenzeitung 2003, p. 473, with case comment by Th. Dreier. Cf. Th. Hoeren, 
‘Pressespiegel und das Urheberrecht’, GRUR 2002, p. 1022.
33  § 49(1) of the German Copyright Act, as in force at that time, referred to ‘Infor-
mationsblätter’.
34  See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 966-966.
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permissible, if articles were included in graphical format 
without offering additional functions, such as a text collec-
tion and an index. This translation of the analogue press 
review exception into the digital environment, the Court 
maintained, was in line with the three-step test of Art. 5(5) 
of the Copyright Directive.35
Need for change
In the current online environment, more flexibility in 
the field of copyright limitations may soon become a leg-
islative necessity rather than a mere interpretative option. 
From an economic perspective, the web 2.0, with its interac-
tive platforms and various forms of user-generated content, 
creates a parallel universe of traditional content providers 
relying on copyright protection, and emerging internet 
industries whose further development depends on robust 
copyright limitations. In particular, the newcomers in the 
online market – social networking platforms like Facebook, 
video forums like YouTube and virtual worlds like Second 
Life – promise a remarkable potential for economic growth 
that already attracted the attention of the OECD.36 Against 
this background, the discussion on copyright’s delicate bal-
ance enters a new stage. The defence of copyright limita-
tions is no longer left to civil society groups and academic 
circles. Strong support can also be expected from online 
industries with new business models that depend on 
breathing space for unauthorised use rather than strong 
copyright protection. 
In the current online environment, complex questions 
about the scope of copyright limitations arise particularly 
with regard to the distribution of markets.37 In the rela-
tion between copyright or database owners and search 
engines, for instance, the right of quotation has become a 
crucial factor. The information displayed by search engines 
is virtually shaped and regulated by the scope of relevant 
national limitations. In the course of implementing the 
EC Copyright Directive, the Dutch legislator, for instance, 
decided to broaden the scope of the right of quotation. 
The long-standing ‘context requirement’ of Art. 15a of the 
Dutch Copyright Act, according to which quotations had to 
serve the purpose of criticism and review, has been attenu-
ated. In the amended version, the provision is also applica-
ble to announcements and expressions serving comparable 
purposes. Accordingly, the quotation right has been held 
to cover information made available by search engines on 
the grounds that these engines ‘announce’ the contents 
of underlying source databases.38 In a case concerning a 
search engine that collects information from the websites 
of housing agencies, the Court of Alkmaar clarified that for 
the quotation right to apply, the reproduction and commu-
nication of collected data to the public had to keep within 
the limits of what was necessary to give a good impression 
of the housing offer concerned.39 The Court specified that, 
under this standard, it was permissible to provide search 
engine users with a description of up to 155 characters, 
address and rent details, and one single picture not exceed-
ing the format of 194x145 pixels.40 
In Germany, the District Court of Hamburg, by contrast, 
refused to bring thumbnails of pictures displayed by Goog-
le’s image search service under the umbrella of the right of 
quotation. Before turning to an analysis of copyright limi-
tations, the Court clarified that a thumbnail did not have 
characteristic features of its own that made the individual 
features of the original work fade away. Accordingly, there 
was no room for qualifying the conversion of pictures into 
thumbnails as a ‘free use’ not falling under the exclusive 
rights of authors by virtue of § 24 of the German Copyright 
Act.41 On this basis, the Court argued with regard to copy-
right limitations that thumbnails could not be regarded as 
permissible quotations in the sense of § 51 no. 2 of the Ger-
man Copyright Act because they did not serve as evidence 
or argumentative basis for independent comments.42 The 
stricter German quotation standard, still requiring use in 
the context of criticism and comment, thus prevented the 
Court from offering breathing space for the image-related 
search service in question. Interestingly, the Court express-
ly recognised that search engines were of 
essential importance for structuring the decentralised architec-
ture of the world wide web, localising widely scattered contents 
and knowledge, and therefore, ultimately, for the functioning 
of a networked society.43
35  See Bundesgerichtshof, ibid., p. 966-967.
36  See OECD, ‘Participative Web: User-Created Content’, document DSTI/ICCP/
IE(2006)7/Final, dated April 12, 2007, online available at http://213.253.134.43/
oecd/pdfs/browseit/9307031E.PDF.
37  Cf. Th. Dreier, ‘Primär- und Folgemärkte’, in: G. Schricker/Th. Dreier/A. Kur, 
Geistiges Eigentum im Dienst der Innovation, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001, p. 51; C. 
Geiger, ‘Die Schranken des Urheberrechts als Instrumente der Innovationsför-
derung – Freie Gedanken zur Ausschließlichkeit im Urheberrecht’, GRUR Int. 
2008, p. 459.
38  See Gerechtshof Arnhem, July 4, 2006, case no. 06/416, LJN AY0089, Mediaforum 
2007, p. 21, with case comment by B. Beuving; AMI 2007, p. 93, with case com-
ment by K.J. Koelman.
39  See Rechtbank Alkmaar, August 7, 2007, case no. 96206, AMI 2007, p. 148, with 
case comment by K.J. Koelman. On procedural grounds, the judgement has 
been annulled by Gerechtshof Amsterdam, December 13, 2007, case no. LJN 
BC0125, online available at www.iept.nl.
40  See Rechtbank Alkmaar, ibid., para. 4.14.
41  See Landgericht Hamburg , September 26, 2008, case no. 308 O 248/07, section 
II.B.4. The decision is online available at http://www.openjur.de/u/30461-308_
o_248-07.html. Cf. Oberlandesgericht Jena, GRUR-RR 2008, p. 223 (224).
42  See Landgericht Hamburg, ibid., section II.B.6.a. With regard to the right of 
quotation in German copyright law, see G. Schricker, in: G. Schricker (ed.), 
Urheberrecht Kommentar, 3rd edn., Munich: C.H. Beck 2006.
43  See Landgericht Hamburg, ibid., section B.I.6.d.: ‘Die Kammer verkennt nicht, 
dass Suchmaschinen, wie sie die Beklagte erfolgreich betreibt, von essentiel-
ler Bedeutung für die Strukturierung der dezentralen Architektur des World 
Wide Web, für das Lokalisieren von weit verstreuten Inhalten und Wissen 
und damit letztlich für die Funktionsfähigkeit einer vernetzten Gesellschaft 
sind.’
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In spite of this ‘esteem for search engine services’, the 
Court did not feel in a position to embark on an exten-
sive interpretation of copyright limitations that had been 
designed by the legislator with an eye to use under different 
circumstances. It was the task of the legislator, the Court 
maintained, to solve the tension between the strong public 
interest in efficient access to graphical online information 
and the economic interests of search engine providers on 
the one hand, and the interests of authors on the other.44
 
The divergent views taken by Dutch and German courts 
show that the control over secondary online markets for 
value-added services, such as search engines, is an open 
question. The German example, moreover, testifies to the 
helplessness of continental-European courts in the face 
of a closed system of meticulously-defined limitations. 
Because of the complexity of the matter – both in terms of 
economic implications and user interests –, a simple black 
or white picture can hardly be drawn. Instead, a limitation 
infrastructure is needed that encourages a balanced, tai-
lor-made solution case-by-case. In view of this need for a 
flexible application of copyright limitations, the current 
one-sided approach to the three-step test appears not only 
undesirable but also unwise and economically dangerous. 
A fair-use framework, by contrast, would offer adequate 
room to manoeuvre and the chance of gradually reconcil-
ing diverging interests and business models. To keep within 
the picture drawn above: it would provide sufficient shades 
of grey. 
US decisions on search engines and image thumbnails, 
not surprisingly, give evidence of a more flexible frame-
work. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, held 
that the smaller, indexed images of Google’s image search 
qualified as a fair use under the US fair-use doctrine. The 
Court grounded its analysis on the notion of transforma-
tive use that, traditionally, constitutes an important factor 
capable of tipping the scales to a finding of fair use.45 Point-
ing out a significant benefit to the public, the Court noted 
that ‘a search engine may be more transformative than a 
parody because a search engine provides an entirely new 
use for the original work, while a parody typically has the 
same entertainment purpose as the original work.’46 In this 
vein, the Court concluded that 
the significantly transformative nature of Google’s search engi-
ne, particularly in light of its public benefit, outweighs Goog-
le’s superseding and commercial uses of the thumbnails in this 
case. In reaching this conclusion, we note the importance of 
analyzing fair use f lexibly in light of new circumstances.47
Conclusion
To allow new internet industries to develop, and take 
advantage of their economic potential, sufficient breath-
ing space for copyright limitations is indispensable. The 
question of an appropriate balance between copyright pro-
tection and copyright limitations, therefore, is not unlikely 
to remain high on the agenda of policy makers and courts 
alike. Given these challenges, the time seems ripe to turn to 
a productive use of the three-step test. Instead of employing 
the test as a straitjacket of copyright limitations, modern 
copyright legislation should seek to encourage its use as a 
refined proportionality test48 that allows both the restric-
tion and the broadening of limitations in accordance with 
the individual circumstances of a given case. The adoption 
of a fair-use system that rests on the flexible, open criteria 
of a conflict with a normal exploitation and an unreasona-
ble prejudice to legitimate interests would pave the way for 
this more flexible and balanced application of the test.49 
Ironically, this proposal recalls the origins of the abstract 
formula. At the 1967 Stockholm Conference for the Revi-
sion of the Berne Convention, the three-step test was per-
ceived as a flexible framework, within which national leg-
islators would enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national 
limitations and satisfying domestic social, cultural and eco-
nomic needs.50 What is proposed here, in other words, is a 
renaissance of this initial understanding of the three-step 
test – the renaissance of an approach to the international 
formula that would lead to a continental-European fair-use 
doctrine offering courts the opportunity to recalibrate the 
scope of copyright limitations case-by-case.
44  See Landgericht Hamburg, ibid., section B.I.6.d.
45  Cf. P.N. Leval, ‘Toward a Fair Use Standard’, Harvard Law Review 103 (1990), p. 
1105 (1111); N.W. Netanel, ‘Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society’, Yale Law 
Journal 106 (1996), p. 283 (381).
46  See US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, May 16, 2007, Perfect 10, Inc. vs. 
Amazon.com, Fd 3d., para. 11. With regard to parody and the notion of trans-
formative use, see also the US Supreme Court decision Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 
510 US 569 (1994), II A: ‘The central purpose of this investigation is to see […] 
whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation 
[…] or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different cha-
racter, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in 
other words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative”.’
47  See US Court of Appeals, ibid., para. 12.
48  See Senftleben, supra note 7, p. 125-133 and 243-244.
49  For guidelines concerning the appropriate interpretation of these criteria, see 
C. Geiger/J. Griffiths/R.M. Hilty, ‘Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of 
the “Three-Step Test” in Copyright Law’, published elsewhere in this issue. The 
Declaration is a joint statement of experts that was prepared in meetings con-
vened by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Munich, and the 
School of Law at Queen Mary, University of London. 
50  See Doc. S/1, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm June 11 to July 
14, 1967, Geneva: WIPO 1971, p. 81.
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